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More than one billion people live in extreme poverty, which is deﬁned by
the World Bank as subsisting on less than one dollar a day.1In 2001, fully half
of the developing world lived on less than two dollars a day. Yet poverty rates
are much lower today than twenty years ago. In the last two decades, the per-
centage of the developing world living in extreme poverty has been cut in half.
While poverty rates were falling, developing countries became increasingly in-
tegrated into the world trading system. Poor countries have slashed protective
tariﬀs and increased their participation in world trade. If we use the share of
exports in gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of globalization, then
developing countries are now more globalized than high-income countries.2
Does globalization reduce poverty? Will ongoing eﬀorts to eliminate
protection and increase world trade improve the lives of the world’s poor?
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1. The poverty estimates in this paragraph are taken from the World Bank’s oﬃcial poverty
web site, at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. The $1-a-day poverty
line is actually $1.08 in 1993 purchasing power parity dollars.
2. See Harrison and Tang (2005).
3. Although there have been a number of recent studies on globalization and inequality,
these volumes focus primarily on distributional consequences of globalization, rather than
poverty. There are exceptions, of course; see, for example, Bhagwati (2004). Bardhan’s publi-
cations on this topic include his Nobel Peace Prize Lecture, published as Social Justice in a
Global Economy (Bardhan 2000), as well as Bardhan (2003, 2004). See also Hertel and Win-
ters (2005), forthcoming.studies by Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2004), and Ravallion (2004a) all acknowledge that they can review only
the indirect evidence regarding the linkages between globalization and
poverty. There have been almost no studies that test for the direct linkages
between the two.4
Yet one of the biggest concerns of globalization’s critics is its impact on
the poor. This introduction and the following chapters provide an econ-
omist’s perspective on how globalization aﬀects poverty in developing
countries.5 By bringing together experts on both international trade
and poverty, we hope to bridge the intellectual divide that separates the
individuals who study each of these phenomena. The ﬁfteen studies and
accompanying discussions that are part of this project ask the following
questions: How has global economic integration aﬀected the poor in de-
veloping countries? Do trade reforms that cut import protection improve
the lives of the poor? Has increasing ﬁnancial integration led to more or
less poverty? How have the poor fared during currency crises? Do agricul-
tural support programs in rich countries hurt the poor in developing coun-
tries? Or do such programs in fact provide assistance by reducing the cost
of food imports? Finally, does food aid hurt the poor by lowering the price
of the goods they sell on local markets?
Although the concept of globalization is quite broad, we focus on two
aspects: (1) international trade in goods and (2) international movements
of capital—including foreign investment, portfolio ﬂows, and aid. Conse-
quently, most of the chapters measure the impact of increased exposure to
trade and international capital ﬂows on poverty. We do not address other
aspects of globalization, such as information ﬂows, migration, or trade in
services. A number of chapters also address the linkages between our pre-
ferred measures of globalization and inequality.
Why is it important to also think about globalization’s impact on in-
equality in a volume devoted to poverty? Most economists expect openness
to trade to be associated with higher growth, and growth is good for the
poor. Consequently, we would expect that increasing trade should lead to
less poverty. Yet if openness to trade is associated with increasing inequal-
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4. Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) write in their insightful and comprehensive
survey that “there are no direct studies of the poverty eﬀects of trade and trade liberalization.”
Goldberg and Pavcnik’s (2004) excellent review points out that “while the literature on trade
and inequality is voluminous, there is virtually no work to date on the relationship between
trade liberalization and poverty.” The few studies that do examine the links between global-
ization and poverty typically use computable general equilibrium models to disentangle the
linkages between trade reform and poverty. While such research provides an important con-
tribution to our understanding of the channels through which globalization could aﬀect
poverty, it is extremely important to be able to look at actual ex post evidence of the impact
of trade and investment reforms on the poor. See the studies cited in Winters, McCulloch,
and McKay (2004), Ravallion (2004a), Chen and Ravallion (2000), and Hertel and Winters
(2005).
5. More information can be found online at http://www.nber.org/books.html.ity, then the growth gains from trade could be wiped out for those at the
bottom of the income distribution. In other words, if the gains from trade
are highly unequal, then the poor may not share the beneﬁts. Many of the
studies in this volume suggest that globalization has been associated with
rising inequality, and that the poor do not always share in the gains from
trade.
The new research presented in this volume takes two diﬀerent ap-
proaches: cross-country studies and individual country studies. The cross-
country studies use aggregate data to examine the impact of globalization
on the number of poor, aggregate growth rates, and inequality. The coun-
try case studies typically use microdata for a single country to examine the
impact of globalization on the incomes of the poor. Cross-country studies
are appealing because they allow authors to generalize beyond one speciﬁc
case study. Yet many countries have information on aggregate poverty for
only two or three points in time, which means that statistical tests using
cross-country data may not yield conclusive results. Consequently, most of
the studies in this volume rely on the use of microdata. These data sets typ-
ically span a number of years, including periods before, during, and after a
trade reform.
What are the lessons that emerge from the various chapters? Although
the issues are complex, some broad themes emerge.
The poor in countries with an abundance of unskilled labor do not always
gain from trade reform. Many economists have used the Heckscher-Ohlin
(HO) framework in international trade to argue that trade liberalization
should raise the incomes of the unskilled in labor-abundant countries.
Most researchers who use this framework to argue that globalization is
good for the world’s poor make a number of heroic assumptions. These as-
sumptions—such as the necessity that all countries produce all goods—
are challenged in this volume. In addition, the country studies show that
labor is not nearly as mobile as the HO trade model assumes; for compara-
tive advantage to increase the incomes of the unskilled, they need to be able
to move out of contracting sectors and into expanding ones. Another rea-
son why the poor may not gain from trade reforms is that developing coun-
tries have historically protected sectors that use unskilled labor, such as tex-
tiles and apparel. This pattern of protection, while at odds with simple
interpretations of HO models, makes sense if standard assumptions (such
as factor price equalization) are relaxed. Trade reforms may result in less
protection for unskilled workers, who are most likely to be poor. Finally,
penetrating global markets even in sectors that traditionally use unskilled
labor requires more skills than the poor in developing countries typically
possess.
The poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization when there
are complementary policies in place. The studies on India and Colombia
suggest that globalization is more likely to beneﬁt the poor if trade reforms
Introduction 3are implemented in conjunction with reducing impediments to labor mo-
bility. In Zambia, poor farmers are only expected to beneﬁt from greater
access to export markets if they also have access to credit, technical know-
how, and other complementary inputs. The studies also point to the im-
portance of social safety nets. In Mexico, if poor corn farmers had not re-
ceived income support from the government, their real incomes would
have been halved during the 1990s. In Ethiopia, if food aid had not been
well targeted, globalization would have had little impact on the poor. The
fact that other policies are needed to ensure that the beneﬁts of trade are
shared across the population suggests that relying on trade reforms alone
to reduce poverty is likely to be disappointing.
Export growth and incoming foreign investment have reduced poverty.
Poverty has fallen in regions where exports or foreign investment is grow-
ing. In Mexico, the poor in the most globalized regions have weathered
macroeconomic crises better than their more isolated neighbors. In India,
opening up to foreign investment has been associated with a decline in
poverty. The study on Zambia suggests that poor consumers gain from fall-
ing prices for the goods they buy, while poor producers in exporting sec-
tors beneﬁt from trade reform through higher prices for their goods. In
Colombia, increasing export activity has been associated with an increase
in compliance with labor legislation and a fall in poverty. In Poland, un-
skilled workers—who are the most likely to be poor—have gained from
Poland’s accession to the European Union.
Financial crises are costly to the poor. In Indonesia, poverty rates in-
creased by at least 50 percent after the currency crisis in 1997. While re-
covery in Indonesia has been rapid, the Mexican economy has yet to fully
recover from its 1995 peso crisis. Poverty rates in Mexico in the year 2000
were higher than they had been ten years earlier. Cross-country evidence
also suggests that ﬁnancial globalization leads to higher consumption and
output volatility in low-income countries. One implication is that low-
income countries are more likely to beneﬁt from ﬁnancial integration if
they also create reliable institutions and pursue macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion policies (including the use of ﬂexible exchange rate regimes). However,
foreign investment ﬂows have very diﬀerent eﬀects from other types of cap-
ital ﬂows. While unrestricted capital ﬂows are associated with a higher like-
lihood of poverty, foreign direct investment inﬂows are associated with a
reduction in poverty. The poverty-reducing eﬀects of foreign direct invest-
ment are clearly documented in the chapters on India and Mexico.
Globalization produces both winners and losers among the poor. It should
not be surprising that the results defy easy generalization. Even within a
single region, two sets of farmers may be aﬀected in opposite ways. In Mex-
ico, while some small and most medium corn farmers saw their incomes fall
by half in the 1990s, large corn farmers gained. Across diﬀerent countries,
poor wage earners in exporting sectors or in sectors with incoming foreign
4 Ann Harrisoninvestment gained from trade and investment reforms; conversely, poverty
rates increased in previously protected sectors that were exposed to import
competition. Within the same country or even the same region, a trade re-
form may lead to income losses for rural agricultural producers and in-
come gains for rural or urban consumers of those same goods.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some
issues associated with measuring both poverty and globalization. Section
3 discusses theoretical links between trade and poverty outcomes. Section
4 summarizes the results from the cross-country studies, while section 5 de-
scribes the results of the country case studies. The studies that address the
impact of capital ﬂows on the poor are summarized in section 6. Although
the focus of this volume is on the relationship between poverty and diﬀer-
ent measures of globalization, a number of authors also address other pos-
sible outcomes associated with globalization; these are described in section
7 of this chapter. Since the evidence suggests that globalization creates
winners as well as losers among the poor, this chapter moves in section 8 to
a discussion of why globalization’s critics seem all too aware of the costs of
globalization and generally fail to see the beneﬁts. A number of research
questions remain unanswered; these are also discussed in section 8. Section
9 concludes.
2 Measuring Globalization and Poverty
There is an enormous literature devoted to trade and poverty measure-
ment. For openness to trade, the authors in this volume use both trade vol-
umes and measures of trade policy. Most contributors favor the use of di-
rect policy measures, such as tariﬀs or quotas, over trade volumes. Trade
volumes are typically measured as shares, such as exports plus imports di-
vided by GDP. Although widely available, trade shares are not ideal be-
cause they are determined by trade policies, geography, country size, and
macroeconomic policies. Globalization of ﬁnancial ﬂows is measured ei-
ther by creating indexes of policy or by using measures of actual ﬂows.
Capital controls, which are collected by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), are examples of policy measures; again, actual capital ﬂows are less
desirable measures of policy than capital controls since ﬂows are outcomes
of many factors.
One important observation that emerges from the various chapters is
that diﬀerent measures of globalization are associated with diﬀerent pov-
erty outcomes. How globalization is measured determines whether global-
ization is good for the poor. Measures of export activity and foreign invest-
ment are generally associated with poverty reduction, while removal of
protection (an ex ante measure of globalization) or import shares (an ex
post measure) are frequently associated with rising poverty. These diﬀerent
eﬀects are consistent with short-run models of international trade (such as
Introduction 5the speciﬁc-sector model) where factors of production cannot easily move
from contracting or import-competing sectors to expanding or export-
oriented ones.
Poverty is typically measured by choosing a poverty line, which reﬂects
the minimum income or consumption necessary to meet basic needs. For
low-income countries, the World Bank has calculated poverty lines at $1
and $2 a day.6 Although these minimum requirements vary across coun-
tries and over time, the $1- and $2-a-day measures allow policymakers to
compare poverty across countries using the same reference point. The
head count measure of poverty identiﬁes the percentage of the population
living in households with consumption or income per person below the
poverty line. The head count is reported either as a percentage (the inci-
dence of poverty) or as the number of individuals who are poor. Another
popular measure is the poverty gap, which measures the mean distance
below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line.
One area of disagreement in poverty measurement is whether poverty
should be measured as the percentage of individuals who are poor (the in-
cidence) or the absolute number of people who are poor. While the inci-
dence of poverty has been falling over the last twenty years, the change in
the absolute numbers of poor individuals depends on the poverty line cho-
sen. The number of individuals living on less than one dollar a day declined
in the 1980s and 1990s, while the number of individuals living on between
one and two dollars a day did not.7 Critics of globalization frequently use
the absolute number of people who are poor as their preferred measure,
while globalization’s supporters (see the comment by Xavier Sala-i-Martin
for chap. 1 in this volume) prefer to use the incidence of poverty. Chapter1,
by Emma Aisbett, shows that this diversity of opinion is one of the reasons
that there is so much disagreement about whether world poverty has been
falling during the period of globalization.
It is important to emphasize that the poverty line itself is not ﬁxed over
time. Eswar S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoﬀ, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan
Kose conclude chapter 11 with the following observation:
One has to acknowledge that poverty is fundamentally a relative mea-
sure, which will probably gain an entirely diﬀerent meaning as the world
economy becomes more integrated....  F o r  e xample, if global growth
continues at a rapid pace during the next century, it is possible that by
the end of the century emerging-market economies, including China and
India, could attain income levels exceeding those of Americans today.
This implies that Malthusian notions of poverty are likely to become a
6 Ann Harrison
6. Actually $1.08 and $2.15 in 1993 purchasing power parity dollars.
7. One possible explanation is that the poor in the world are becoming better oﬀ, moving
from incomes of less than $1 to less than $2 per day. Yet this possibility has not been ade-
quately explored, in large part because this necessitates being able to follow the same poor
household or individual over time.distant memory in most parts of the world as global income inexorably
expands over the next century, and issues of inequality, rather than sub-
sistence, will increasingly take center stage in the poverty debate.
The country case studies show that acceptable poverty lines vary across
countries and through time. As discussed by Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg
and Nina Pavcnik in chapter 6, the $1-a-day line is indicative of poverty
lines used in very poor countries, but not in middle-income countries such
as Colombia. The oﬃcial poverty line in Colombia is closer to three (pur-
chasing power parity) dollars a day. In the United States, the poverty line
in 2004 was closer to thirty dollars a day. As acceptable deﬁnitions of pov-
erty shift over time, research on inequality and the overall distribution of
income becomes increasingly important. This is one reason why GordonH.
Hanson, Ethan Ligon, and Duncan Thomas and Elizabeth Frankenberg,
in their chapters, report the impact of globalization on the entire distribu-
tion of income, using nonparametric techniques.
3 Theoretical Linkages between Globalization and Poverty
One of the most famous theorems in international trade is the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, which in its simplest form suggests that the abundant
factor should see an increase in its real income when a country opens up to
trade. If the abundant factor in developing countries is unskilled labor,
then this framework suggests that the poor (unskilled) in developing coun-
tries have the most to gain from trade. Anne Krueger (1983) and Jagdish
Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan (2002) have all used this insight to argue
that trade reforms in developing countries should be pro-poor, since these
countries are most likely to have a comparative advantage in producing
goods made with unskilled labor. From this perspective, expanding trade
opportunities should cut poverty and reduce inequality within poor coun-
tries.
In chapter 2, which examines the theoretical linkages between trade
and poverty, Donald R. Davis and Prachi Mishra argue that “Stolper-
Samuelson is dead.” They write eloquently that applying trade theory to sug-
gest that liberalization will raise the wages of the unskilled in unskilled-
abundant countries is “worse than wrong—it is dangerous.” Davis and
Mishra show that such arguments are based on a very narrow interpreta-
tion of the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem. In particular, SS holds only if
all countries produce all goods, if the goods imported from abroad and
produced domestically are close substitutes, or if comparative advantage
can be ﬁxed vis-à-vis all trading partners. As an illustration, a poor coun-
try in a world with many factors and many goods may no longer have a
comparative advantage in producing unskilled-intensive goods. This idea
is easy to understand in the context of three countries—for example, the
Introduction 7United States, Mexico, and China. Although Mexico might have a com-
parative advantage in producing low-skill goods in trade with the United
States, its comparative advantage switches vis-à-vis trade with China.
Trade reform also aﬀects the poor by changing the prices they face as
consumers and producers. Davis and Mishra develop a simple model to
show that if imports and domestic goods (produced by the poor) are non-
competing, then the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of a trade reform would be to raise
real incomes of the poor. Clearly, the poor gain from tariﬀ reductions on
goods that they buy. If globalization raises the prices of goods produced by
the poor—such as agricultural products marketed by farmers—then pov-
erty is also likely to decline.
Many of the authors in this volume do not use the HO model as their
framework but adopt a speciﬁc-sector framework. In the speciﬁc-sector
framework, workers or machines may be attached to a speciﬁc sector or in-
dustry and unable to relocate easily. Consequently, any reduction in pro-
tection to sector X will lead to a fall in the incomes of workers who previ-
ously produced goods for that sector and are unable to relocate elsewhere.
The mechanism is the following: a fall in protection is assumed to put
downward pressure on the price of the previously protected good, which in
turn shifts labor demand downward. It is important to remember, however,
that the reverse is also true: any increase in export activity in sector Y
would then be beneﬁcial to workers attached to that sector. The speciﬁc-
sector model suggests that workers may gain from globalization depending
on which sectors (import-competing or exporting) they are attached to;
this is very diﬀerent from the HO framework, which suggests that winners
and losers from globalization can be identiﬁed by their skill levels, regard-
less of where they work. If the HO assumption of perfect labor mobility
across sectors is violated, then the speciﬁc-sector model may be the more
appropriate framework, at least in the short run.
In chapter 3, William Easterly also explores the theoretical linkages be-
tween globalization and poverty, but in the context of a neoclassical growth
model. Easterly shows that globalization could aﬀect the incomes of the
poor in two opposite ways. If productivity levels are similar but endowments
are diﬀerent, globalization should raise the incomes of the poor. Globaliza-
tion, by relaxing constraints on the movement of goods and factors, will al-
low factor returns to equalize across countries. This is the factor endowment
view. If poor countries are more endowed with (unskilled) labor, then relax-
ing constraints on global trade or factor ﬂows will lead capital to ﬂow to
poor countries, and per capita incomes there should rise. A second possibil-
ity is the productivity view. Diﬀerences in per capita incomes may stem from
exogenous productivity diﬀerences across countries rather than diﬀerences
in endowments. This second possibility implies that globalization either will
have no impact on poverty or could exacerbate poverty, as capital is drawn
away from low-productivity toward high-productivity regions.
8 Ann HarrisonAart Kraay (in the chap. 3 comment), Sala-i-Martin, and Prasad and his
coauthors emphasize that globalization could raise the incomes of the
poor through a third channel: by increasing long-run growth. To reconcile
their perspective with Easterly’s framework, this means that increases in
trade or capital ﬂows could increase incomes of the poor by raising pro-
ductivity or through the accumulation of capital. Imports of new goods
embody new technology, which in turn raises productivity, while incoming
foreign investment provides the possibility for technology transfer. If the
income eﬀects are fairly uniform, then the increase in aggregate income re-
sulting from globalization-induced productivity gains should improve the
incomes of the poor.
4 Cross-Country Evidence
The cross-country studies present evidence on the relationship between
poverty, inequality, and globalization. Easterly ﬁnds that increasing trade
integration is associated with falling inequality within developed countries
and greater inequality within developing countries. His results are consis-
tent with the evidence presented in chapter 4 by Branko Milanovic and Lyn
Squire, who construct their own measures of both interindustry and inte-
roccupation wage inequality using detailed information on wages across
occupations and industries. Milanovic and Squire ﬁnd that globalization,
measured using average tariﬀs, leads to rising inequality in poor countries
and falling inequality in rich countries.
Both Easterly’s and Milanovic and Squire’s chapters ﬁnd that increasing
openness to trade is associated with rising inequality in poor countries.
Easterly argues that the evidence is consistent with his productivity view,
whereby exogenous diﬀerences in productivity lead capital to ﬂow from
poor to rich countries and exacerbate inequality in poor countries. Milano-
vic and Squire emphasize the lack of labor mobility and the weak power
of unions to explain why increasing openness to trade is associated with
rising inequality in poor countries.
In his comment on Easterly’s chapter, Kraay reviews the evidence on (1)
the linkages between trade and growth, and (2) the relationship between
growth and poverty. Although some previous studies on the relationship
between trade and growth have been discredited (see Rodriguez and Ro-
drik 2000 and Harrison and Hanson 1999), Kraay cites several new stud-
ies that ﬁnd that increasing openness to trade is associated with higher
growth. Kraay also points to his own work showing that growth is good for
the poor, and concludes that since trade enhances growth, which in turn
reduces poverty, then globalization is good for the poor.
In chapter 5, Margaret McMillan, Alix Peterson Zwane, and Nava
Ashraf use cross-country data to measure the impact of Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) support policies for
Introduction 9agriculture on poverty. The vast majority of least developed countries have
historically been net importers of food, particularly cereals, which are
among the crops most subsidized by the OECD. As net food importers,
poor countries may gain from rich-country subsidies (see also Panagariya
2002, 2004; Valdes and McCalla 1999). Even within food-exporting coun-
tries, the poorest members of society may be net purchasers of food. How-
ever, McMillan and coauthors ﬁnd no support in the cross-country analysis
for the claim that OECD policies worsen poverty in developing countries.
None of these studies directly examine the aggregate relationship be-
tween diﬀerent poverty measures and globalization. Previous research on
this topic, including Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002), combines measures of
income distribution derived from household surveys with aggregate na-
tional income data to measure the income of the poor. Deaton (2001, 2003)
suggests that using aggregate national income data to interpret cross-
country correlations between aggregate growth and poverty reduction is
likely to be misleading. This is because the observed correlation could be
attributable to measurement error as well as biases in national income sta-
tistics, which generally suggest a much higher rate of poverty reduction rel-
ative to trends in aggregate poverty implied by household surveys.
One solution to this problem is to use measures of poverty based exclu-
sively on household surveys. Yet the limited time series for poverty data from
these surveys makes it almost impossible to conclude anything on the aggre-
gate relationship between openness and poverty. I show this in tables 1 and
2, which report regression results on the linkages between openness, GDP
growth, and diﬀerent measures of poverty. I begin by revisiting the evidence
on the linkages between trade and growth; these results are presented in table
1. Openness to trade is measured in two diﬀerent ways, as either (1) the ratio
of trade (X   M) to GDP or (2) average tariﬀs, deﬁned as tariﬀ revenues di-
vided by imports. The results suggest that an increase in openness—using
these two measures—is associated with an increase in aggregate income.8
The problems of small sample size are illustrated in columns (5) and (10)
of table 1. I redo the basic speciﬁcations but restrict the sample to the ob-
servations for the country-years where poverty rates could be calculated
based on household surveys. In the restricted sample the link between
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8. To address concerns regarding endogeneity, openness is measured using either its three-
year lag or the contemporaneous value instrumented using lagged values. These results are
robust to the inclusion of other controls, such as country ﬁxed eﬀects or policy variables likely
to be correlated with trade policies. Other extensions, using growth of GDP per capita as the
dependent variable instead of income per capita, yield similar results. Although some speci-
ﬁcations—notably those that include country ﬁxed eﬀects and instrument for openness using
lagged values—are not always signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, the evidence is generally con-
sistent with a positive relationship between openness and income or growth. The evidence is
also consistent with recent work by Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004), who apply more innova-
tive ways to address the endogeneity of openness and continue to ﬁnd a positive relationship































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.openness to trade and GDP per capita weakens signiﬁcantly. The weak-
ness of the association between openness and growth in this small sample
suggests that eﬀorts to ﬁnd any direct relationship between openness and
poverty reduction using cross-country data sets are likely to be plagued by
limited data availability.
The association between measures of openness, GDP growth, and pov-
erty is presented in table 2. Measures of poverty are derived from house-
hold sample surveys made available by the World Bank. While the results
are robust to the poverty measure chosen, in table 2 we deﬁne poverty as
the percentage of households living on less than $1 a day in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms. The evidence in table 2, conﬁrming evidence
presented by Besley and Burgess (2003) as well as other researchers, sug-
gests that growth is indeed good for the poor. We use several diﬀerent mea-
sures of income: contemporaneous income, income lagged three periods,
and contemporaneous income instrumented using annual average levels of
precipitation and temperature. Across all speciﬁcations, aggregate income
or aggregate income growth (not shown here) is associated with a reduc-
tion in the percentage of the population that is poor.9
Although the results presented in tables 1 and 2 suggest a strong link
from trade integration to aggregate income, and from income growth to
poverty reduction, the evidence on direct linkages between trade shares or
tariﬀs and poverty outcomes is quite weak. While the ﬁrst three columns of
table 2 suggest that openness to trade (measured using either trade shares
or tariﬀs) is associated with less poverty, this result disappears when we in-
troduce country ﬁxed eﬀects. I show this graphically in ﬁgures 1 and 2. In
ﬁgure 1, there is a positive relationship between globalization and poverty
reduction, but this association disappears in ﬁgure 2 with the addition of
country eﬀects.10
To summarize, there is no evidence in the aggregate data that trade re-
forms are good or bad for the poor.11 Yet even if we could identify a robust
Introduction 13
9. The coeﬃcients on real GDP per capita reported in tables 3 and 4 are much larger than
those reported by Besley and Burgess (2003). The poverty-reducing eﬀects of growth are
larger here because any one of the following changes alone leads to big changes in the coeﬃ-
cient on GDP per capita: the inclusion of time eﬀects, a larger sample with more years of data
and more countries, the inclusion of other policy determinants of poverty, or a PPP real GDP
per capita measure. The fact that any of these modiﬁcations leads to such large changes in the
coeﬃcient on GDP per capita suggests that—despite a strong poverty-reducing eﬀect of
growth—the exact magnitude of the eﬀect cannot be precisely estimated.
10. Similar results were found when using diﬀerent poverty measures—such as the per-
centage of the poor living on less than PPP$2 per day, or the incomes of the poorest quintile
or decile.
11. In a comparable exercise using country-level poverty head counts and trade shares,
Ravallion (2004b) reaches a similar conclusion; he argues that there is no robust relationship
between poverty and globalization in the aggregate data. Possibly the only exception to these
general conclusions is Agénor (2004), who ﬁnds that there is a nonlinear relationship between
measures of poverty and globalization. Agénor ﬁnds that at low levels, globalization appears
to hurt the poor, but beyond a certain threshold, it seems to reduce poverty. For earlier related
studies, see Dollar (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2002).Fig. 1 Correlation between fraction of households living on $1 per day and average
import tariﬀ
Fig. 2 Correlation between fraction of households living on $1 per day and average
import tariﬀ controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀectsrelationship between trade reform and poverty reduction in the aggregate
data, cross-country work remains problematic for several reasons. First, it
is diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate instruments for trade policy at the country
level, or to adequately control for other changes that are occurring at the
same time. Second, even if cross-country studies point to a positive rela-
tionship between globalization and overall growth, such growth may lead
to unequal gains across diﬀerent levels of income. If the growth eﬀects on
average are small and there are large distributional consequences, trade-
induced growth could be accompanied by a decline in incomes of the poor.
The cross-country evidence presented by Easterly and by Milanovic and
Squire is consistent with this view: their chapters suggest that globalization
has been accompanied by increasing inequality in poor countries. Finally,
even if the cross-country evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 overcomes
this problem by directly testing for the relationship between poverty and
trade reform, there may be signiﬁcant underlying heterogeneity across
diﬀerent segments of the population (see also Ravallion 2004a). Aggregate
poverty could move in one direction or remain unchanged while poverty
increases in some parts of a country and declines in others.
For all these reasons, most of the studies in this volume focus on changes
in trade policy within a particular country. These studies typically use
highly disaggregated data—at the level of the household or the enter-
prise—to identify the impact of trade policy. Since these studies exploit dif-
ferences in globalization across sectors or regions within the same coun-
try, they are able to overcome the problem that trade reforms are usually
introduced concurrently with other countrywide reforms such as exchange
rate stabilization or privatization. Due to the availability of detailed house-
hold surveys documenting the existence of the poor, these surveys are also
able to successfully address the problem of lack of comparable time series
data. Finally, the authors of these studies are generally aware of the prob-
lem of the endogeneity of trade reform and are usually able to use the panel
nature of these data sets to address this issue.12
5 Country Case Studies
This section reviews the ten country case studies for the volume. These
country studies use household- or ﬁrm-level data to measure (1) the impact
of globalization on employment and labor incomes of the poor and (2) the
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12. Even preferred measures of globalization, such as tariﬀs or capital controls, are likely
to be endogenously determined. The possible endogeneity of tariﬀs, as well as solutions to this
problem, is explored in a number of the individual chapters. Since uniformity in tariﬀs is fre-
quently a goal of trade reform, tariﬀ reductions are often inversely linked to initial tariﬀ lev-
els. To achieve uniformity, policymakers must apply the largest tariﬀ reductions to those sec-
tors with the highest initial protection levels. Consequently, some chapter authors use initial
levels of protection as an instrument for changes in tariﬀs.impact of globalization on poverty through changes in the prices of goods
produced and consumed by the poor.
The Impact of Globalization on Employment 
and Labor Incomes of the Poor
Country studies on Colombia, India, Mexico, and Poland examine the
relationship between trade reform and labor market outcomes. In chapter
6 Goldberg and Pavcnik investigate the impact of a large reduction in av-
erage tariﬀs in Colombia between 1984 and 1998 on a variety of urban la-
bor market outcomes: the probability of becoming unemployed, minimum
wage compliance, informal-sector employment, and the incidence of pov-
erty. Analyzing the relationship between globalization and these diﬀerent
labor market outcomes is useful since poverty is highly correlated with un-
employment, informal-sector employment, and noncompliance with the
minimum wage.
The Colombian experience suggests that individuals in sectors with in-
creasing import competition are likely to become poorer, while those in
sectors where exports are growing are less likely to be poor. Import com-
petition increases the likelihood of unemployment and informality, and is
associated with a higher incidence of poverty. Export growth is associated
with the opposite: falling informal-sector employment, rising minimum
wage compliance, and falling poverty. Goldberg and Pavcnik present evi-
dence suggesting that workers cannot easily relocate away from contract-
ing toward expanding sectors in the context of trade reforms, contradict-
ing the assumption of perfect labor mobility in the HO framework.
Consistent with other studies in the volume, this analysis of the Colombian
trade reforms suggests the importance of complementary policies for min-
imizing the adverse eﬀects of trade reform on the poor. When trade reform
is accompanied by labor market reforms that make it easier for ﬁrms to hire
or ﬁre and ease relocation for workers, the adverse impact of tariﬀ reduc-
tions on poverty disappears.
This is exactly the conclusion reached in chapter 7 by Petia Topalova,
who estimates the impact of trade reform in India on poverty. In the 1990s,
India embarked on a remarkable trade reform, reversing decades of pro-
tectionist policies that had led to average tariﬀs in excess of 90 percent. Us-
ing household data that span the period before and after the reform period,
Topalova relates changes in tariﬀs to changes in the incidence of poverty.
In particular, she uses the interaction between the share of a district’s pop-
ulation employed by an industry on the eve of the economic reforms and
the reduction in trade barriers in that industry as a measure of a district’s
exposure to foreign trade. Because industrial composition is predeter-
mined and trade liberalization was unanticipated, she argues that it is ap-
propriate to causally interpret the correlation between the changes in the
levels of poverty and trade exposure.
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the trade reforms than other income groups or the urban poor. A rural dis-
trict experiencing the mean level of tariﬀ reductions saw a 2 percent in-
crease in poverty, accounting for a setback of about 15 percent of India’s
progress in poverty reduction over the 1990s. In other words, the progress
in poverty reduction experienced in rural India was lower in trade-aﬀected
areas, where (rural) poverty may have fallen by an average of 11 instead of
13 percentage points between 1987 and 1999.13To identify the net contribu-
tion of globalization to poverty reduction in India would require identify-
ing ﬁrst the contribution of globalization to the overall poverty reduction
across all of India during the 1990s, and then netting out the adverse im-
pact on districts with increasing import competition. Topalova also dis-
cusses why the rural poor gained less than other groups from liberalization:
restrictions on labor mobility in rural areas have impeded adjustment. She
ﬁnds that the negative impact of trade policy on poverty is reduced or elim-
inated in regions with ﬂexible labor laws.
While the studies on Colombia and India suggest that the gains from
trade reforms were less likely to beneﬁt the poor, the evidence for Mexico
and Poland suggests the opposite. In chapter 10 Hanson explores the dif-
ferent outcomes for individuals born in states with high exposure to globali-
zation versus individuals born in states with low exposure to globaliza-
tion between 1990 and 2000. He ﬁnds that the income of individuals in
high-exposure states increased relative to the income of individuals in low-
exposure states. While labor incomes in the 1990s deteriorated in both re-
gions, due in part to Mexico’s peso crisis in 1995, the deterioration wasmuch
less severe in states with high exposure to globalization.
While poverty was falling dramatically in India during this period, be-
tween 1990 and 2000 poverty in Mexico increased. In the states with low
exposure to globalization, poverty increased from 32 to 40 percent; in the
states with high exposure, poverty increased only slightly, from 21 to 22
percent. If we take the diﬀerence in the increase in poverty within each re-
gion over the 1990s, we ﬁnd that poverty increased by 8 percent in low-
exposure states and by only 1 percent in high-exposure states. The diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerence estimator is the diﬀerential in these two changes—that
is, 8 – 1 equals 7 percentage points—and is the basis for Hanson’s conclu-
sions that the incidence of wage poverty in low-exposure states increased
relative to poverty in high-exposure states by approximately 7 percent.
How can we reconcile the ﬁndings on Mexico and India? As pointed out
by Hanson, the peso crisis in Mexico in 1995 is one major reason for the ag-
gregate increase in poverty, in contrast to India, which experienced no ma-
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13. These mean poverty rates are taken from the mean poverty rates for the rural areas in
the national sample surveys for 1987 and 1999. See appendix tables in Topalova (chap. 7 in the
volume). Mean poverty in the urban areas is reported separately. Topalova also reports trends
in alternative measures of poverty, including the poverty gap and changes in consumption.jor adverse macroeconomic shock during this period. In addition, Hanson
deﬁnes high-globalization states to include those with a high proportion of
maquiladoras—production activities designated for exports—and foreign
direct investment. Topalova also ﬁnds, consistent with Hanson’s chapter,
that poverty fell more in regions that exported more or received more for-
eign direct investment. Consequently, both studies suggest that export ac-
tivity and foreign direct investment are correlated with beneﬁcial outcomes
for the poor.
In chapter 8, Chor-ching Goh and Beata S. Javorcik examine the rela-
tionship between tariﬀ changes and wages of workers in Poland. Poland
embarked on signiﬁcant trade reforms during the 1990s, when the country
moved from a closed to a very open economy, particularly vis-à-vis the Eu-
ropean Union. Poland makes an excellent case study in part because
changes in its tariﬀs can be treated as exogenous, as they were stipulated by
the Association Agreement between the European community and Poland
signed in 1991.
Goh and Javorcik demonstrate that labor mobility is fairly restricted in
Poland, placing their analysis also in the context of a speciﬁc-sector frame-
work. Their results suggest that workers in sectors that experienced the
largest tariﬀ declines experienced the highest increases in wages. They
present evidence showing that tariﬀ declines led to wage increases because
ﬁrms were forced to increase productivity, and productivity increases re-
sulted in higher wages. These micro-level results showing a positive rela-
tionship between tariﬀ reductions and productivity increases are consis-
tent with the more aggregate evidence on the positive relationship between
openness to trade and aggregate growth. Their results are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent, however, from some of the other studies, since they ﬁnd that work-
ers in sectors with the biggest tariﬀ reductions gained the most.
Impact of Globalization on Poverty via Prices 
of Production and Consumption Goods
In many developing countries, wages are not the primary source of in-
come for the rural poor. In chapter 9, Jorge F. Balat and Guido G. Porto
calculate that in Zambia wages accounted for only 6 percent of income for
the rural poor in 1998. Consequently, globalization could aﬀect poverty by
aﬀecting the prices of goods consumed by the poor (the consumption
channel) and goods produced by the poor (the production channel).
In many cases, the urban poor are net consumers of agricultural prod-
ucts, and the rural poor are net producers of those same products; in this
case, an increase in agricultural prices caused (for example) by a removal of
export taxes could lead to an increase in urban poverty but a decline in ru-
ral poverty. These linkages are explored to various degrees in the studies
on Ethiopia, Mexico, and Zambia. In chapter 5, McMillan, Zwane, and
Ashraf explore the impact of liberalizing Mexico’s corn market on the in-
18 Ann Harrisoncomes of the poor rural farmers. The evidence suggests that during the
1990s, imports of both white and yellow corn increased, and prices of Mex-
ican corn fell. However, they also ﬁnd that the majority of the poorest corn
farmers are net consumers of corn and hence beneﬁted from the drop in
corn prices. The income from corn production among middle-income farm-
ers who are mostly net sellers fell, both as a share of total income and in ab-
solute terms. The decline in income from corn production among those
farmers who are net sellers would have translated into an equivalent decline
in real income if farmer incomes had not been supplemented with transfers
through government programs such as PROCAMPO and PROGRESA.
In their study of Ethiopian rural grain producers in chapter 13, James
Levinsohn and Margaret McMillan explore the impact of food aid on both
consumption and production of the rural poor. This chapter addresses the
concern that food aid further exacerbates poverty by depressing incomes
of rural producers. While Levinsohn and McMillan conﬁrm that a more
optimal arrangement would be to buy food from local producers and dis-
tribute it to poor consumers,14 they also show that the net impact of food
aid on the poor in Ethiopia has been positive. This is because the poor in
Ethiopia are primarily net consumers, rather than net producers of food,
and consequently food aid has alleviated poverty. As pointed out by Rohini
Pande in her excellent discussion of this chapter, these results are contin-
gent on food aid actually reaching the poor. Levinsohn and McMillan ar-
gue that this is often the case.
For Zambia, Balat and Porto calculate the impact of liberalizing the mar-
ket for maize, which was heavily subsidized for both consumers and pro-
ducers. They ﬁnd that the resulting price increase led to consumption losses,
which were oﬀset by domestic market liberalization. They also measure the
potential increase in income due to switching from production for home
consumption to production and wage activities associated with production
of cash crops. Balat and Porto estimate that rural Zambians would gain sub-
stantially from expanding into the production of cash crops, particularly in
the production of cotton, tobacco, and maize. However, Balat and Porto
also caution that such gains can only be achieved if other complementary
policies are in place. These would include extension services, infrastructure,
irrigation, access to credit and ﬁnance, and education and health services.
Balat and Porto also point to the fact that Zambia needs to have access to
international agricultural markets in order to realize potential gains.
6 Capital Flows and Poverty
Another avenue through which globalization could aﬀect the welfare of
the poor is through ﬁnancial liberalization, which has increased the scope
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14. This assumes that local purchase does not drive prices up for some poor people.for capital to ﬂow to developing countries. For this volume, Prasad and
coauthors document in chapter 11 that both developed and developing
countries have become increasingly open to capital ﬂows, measured using
either policy instruments such as capital controls or ex post capital ﬂows.
In theory, openness to capital ﬂows could alleviate poverty through sev-
eral channels. If greater ﬁnancial integration contributes to higher growth
by expanding access to capital, expanding access to new technology, stim-
ulating domestic ﬁnancial-sector development, reducing the cost of capi-
tal, and alleviating domestic credit constraints, then such growth should
reduce poverty. Access to international capital markets should also allow
countries to smooth consumption shocks, reducing output or consump-
tion volatility. Prasad and coauthors begin by examining the relationship
between ﬁnancial integration and growth. Reviewing over a dozen studies
and examining the data themselves, they ﬁnd that there is no clear rela-
tionship between the two. This suggests that the impact of ﬁnancial inte-
gration on poverty—via possible growth eﬀects—is likely to be small.
They argue that since there are no clear linkages between ﬁnancial inte-
gration and growth in the aggregate cross-country evidence, direct linkages
between ﬁnancial integration and poverty are also likely to be diﬃcult to
ﬁnd.
They also explore another link: whether ﬁnancial integration has
smoothed or exacerbated output and consumption volatility. They point
out that greater macroeconomic volatility probably increases both ab-
solute and relative measures of poverty, particularly when there are ﬁnan-
cial crises. Since the poor are likely to be hurt in periods of consumption
volatility, income smoothing made possible by global ﬁnancial integration
could be beneﬁcial to the poor. However, the authors ﬁnd that the opposite
is true: ﬁnancial globalization in developing countries is associated with
higher consumption volatility. They posit the existence of a threshold ef-
fect: beyond a certain level of ﬁnancial integration (50 percent of GDP), ﬁ-
nancial integration signiﬁcantly reduces volatility. However, most devel-
oping countries are well below this threshold.
Prasad and coauthors point out that despite the lack of evidence of any
association between ﬁnancial globalization and growth, protectionism is
not the answer. They suggest that if ﬁnancial globalization is approached
with the right set of complementary policies, then it is likely to be growth
promoting and also less likely to lead to higher consumption volatility.
These policies include the use of ﬂexible exchange rates, macroeconomic
stabilization policies, and the development of strong institutions. The au-
thors’ deﬁnition of institutional development and good governance in-
cludes transparency in business and government transactions, control of
corruption, rule of law, and ﬁnancial supervisory capacity.
Much of the increases in consumption volatility identiﬁed by Prasad and
coauthors for less ﬁnancially integrated countries occurred in the context
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justiﬁcation for addressing the links between currency crises and poverty
outcomes in this study is simple: for many developing countries, ﬁnancial
globalization has been accompanied by more frequent currency crises,
which in turn have implications for poverty. One study in the volume—
chapter 12, by Duncan Thomas and Elizabeth Frankenberg—examines
the impact of such a crisis on the poor. Using longitudinal household sur-
vey data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), Thomas and
Frankenberg examine the immediate and medium-term eﬀects of the East
Asian crisis on multiple dimensions of well-being. In IFLS, the same
households were interviewed a few months before the onset of the crisis, a
year later, and again two years after that, which provides unique oppor-
tunities for measuring the magnitude and distribution of the eﬀects of the
crisis on the population.
Thomas and Frankenberg demonstrate that in the ﬁrst year of the
crisis, poverty rose by between 50 and 100 percent, real wages declined
by around 40 percent, and household per capita consumption fell by
around 15 percent. However, focusing exclusively on changes in real re-
sources is complicated by the fact that measurement of prices in an en-
vironment of extremely volatile prices is not straightforward. Moreover,
it misses important dimensions of response by households. These in-
clude changes in leisure (labor supply), changes in living arrangements
(household size and thus per capita household resources), changes in as-
sets, and changes in investments in human capital. These responses not
only are quantitatively important but also highlight the resilience of
families and households in the face of large unanticipated shocks as they
draw on a wide array of mechanisms to respond to the changes in op-
portunities they face.
While the volatility of bank borrowing and portfolio ﬂows may be costly
to the poor, many of the authors in this volume emphasize the beneﬁts from
another type of inﬂow: foreign direct investment. Prasad and his coauthors
emphasize that the composition of capital ﬂows can have a signiﬁcant im-
pact on a country’s vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises. They also document
that foreign direct investment ﬂows are signiﬁcantly less volatile than other
types of ﬂows. The studies on Mexico, India, Poland, and Colombia all
demonstrate that incoming foreign investment is associated with a signiﬁ-
cant reduction in poverty.
7 Measuring Other Eﬀects of Globalization
While the primary focus of the studies in this volume is on poverty alle-
viation, several of the studies also examine other outcomes associated with
globalization. Three of the country case studies test for the relationship
between globalization and inequality, complementing the cross-country
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crodata sets have found that trade and capital ﬂows are frequently associ-
ated with an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor.16 The coun-
try case studies on India, Poland, China, and Colombia prepared for this
volume, however, suggest that the evidence is mixed. Evidence presented
by Topalova on India suggests that despite the increase in inequality in the
1990s, there is no relationship between trade reform and inequality, using
the standard deviation of log consumption and the mean logarithmic devi-
ation of consumption as measures of inequality. For Colombia, Goldberg
and Pavcnik show that trade reform was associated with increasing in-
equality, in part because the most protected sectors prior to reform were
sectors with a high share of unskilled workers. For Poland, Goh and Ja-
vorcik suggest the reverse: trade reforms increased the returns to unskilled
workers relative to skilled workers, contributing to a decline in inequality.
A diﬀerent approach to measuring the impact of globalization on in-
comes is taken by James Levinsohn in chapter 15. Levinsohn points out
that one of the challenges to analyzing the impact of globalization is that
increasing openness to trade and investment are typically accompanied by
many other changes. In South Africa, the ratio of trade to GDP increased
from 44 percent to 70 percent between 1991 and 2002, and there was a 200-
fold increase in foreign investment. These changes were accompanied by
many other developments, including the end of apartheid, the introduction
of democracy, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To separate the impact of
globalization, he reasons, one approach would be to analyze whether the
returns to speaking English increased. The evidence suggests that, con-
trolling for other factors, the returns to speaking English did in fact in-
crease, but only for whites. The fact that the returns to speaking English in-
creased only for whites and not for other races suggests that the impact of
globalization has been uneven in South Africa. This pattern of uneven
gains is consistent with the other evidence presented in the cross-country
studies and several of the individual case studies.
Another consequence of globalization, which is explored by Ligon in his
study on China (chap. 14), is its possible impact on household welfare by
aﬀecting household risk. Prasad and his coauthors point out in chapter 11
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15. As pointed out by Aisbett, Sala-i-Martin, and Milanovic and Squire in their respective
chapters, debate continues on the nature and direction of trends in inequality. Within coun-
tries, inequality is generally rising. Across countries, inequality is stable or falling if we weight
by country size, in large part because of the recent successes of China and India in reducing
poverty. As Sala-i-Martin and others have emphasized, the correct measure of global social
welfare is to use such country weights when the outcome of interest is the welfare of individ-
uals. This is of course still a very rough proxy, since it disregards income inequality between
individuals within countries. Thus, access to most countries’ income or expenditure surveys
is needed for an accurate picture of individual-level welfare.
16. See chapter 10 for Hanson’s review of this literature, which covers microevidence on the
relationship between diﬀerent measures of globalization and inequality for Chile, Mexico,
Colombia, and Hong Kong.that the increase in consumption volatility possibly engendered by ﬁnan-
cial liberalization among the less developed countries could be harmful to
the poor, but they do not explicitly model the impact of increasing risk on
household welfare. In China, recent increases in urban income inequality
are mirrored in increases in inequality in consumption expenditures. This
connection between changes in the distribution of income and consump-
tion expenditures could be entirely attributable to diﬀerences in prefer-
ences or could be caused by imperfections in the markets for credit and
insurance, which ordinarily would serve to equate these intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution. Ligon presumes that market imperfections
drive changes in the distribution of expenditures, and he uses data on ex-
penditures from repeated cross sections of urban households in China to
estimate a Markov transition function for shares of expenditures over the
period 1985–2001. He then uses this estimated function to compute the
welfare losses attributable to risk over this period and to predict the future
trajectory of inequality from 2001 through 2025. Ligon’s contribution em-
phasizes that the amount of risk a household faces depends much more on
its position in the consumption distribution than it does on aggregate
shocks, whatever their source.17
8 Globalization’s Critics and Some Remaining Questions
Why does there continue to be so much criticism of globalization? This
is the central question of Aisbett’s chapter (chap. 1). Aisbett argues that
this continued criticism is due to several factors: the use of diﬀerent
methodologies in estimating poverty and inequality, the concerns of glob-
alization’s critics about the short-term costs versus the longer-term gains
from trade reform, their rejection of a perfectly competitive framework,
and diﬀerent interpretations regarding the evidence. Aisbett argues that
people have a natural tendency to weight the information they receive ac-
cording to their prior beliefs and values. Thus, evidence that is objectively
“mixed” is quite likely to be interpreted by one type of person as very pos-
itive and by another as very negative. The mere fact that there are some los-
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17. The contribution of globalization to the decline in poverty within China is clearly a
topic that deserves further research. Ravallion (2004a) suggests somewhat provocatively that
the signiﬁcant reduction in poverty in China over the last twenty years is probably not related
to its phenomenal increase as a global exporter. He uses as evidence aggregate time series
data, in contrast to Shang-Jin Wei (chap. 14 comment), who has access to more disaggregate
information. Nevertheless, Ravallion makes the important point that average tariﬀs and non-
tariﬀbarriers barely fell during the period of most rapid poverty reduction in China. It should
be evident from this discussion that the choice of aggregation and the measure of globaliza-
tion are likely to be key in resolving this debate. In addition, Wei in his comment in this vol-
ume and in other research employs measures of export activity or foreign investment to show
that both are associated with desirable outcomes, while Ravallion looks at overall trade
shares.ers among the poor from globalization will lead people with negative pri-
ors to believe globalization is negative.
The second part of Aisbett’s answer is to examine what types of beliefs
and values lead people to a more negative interpretation of the evidence on
globalization and poverty. The values which she identiﬁes include concern
over inequality, independent of poverty. In particular, globalization’s crit-
ics feel diﬀerently about the polarization of the income distribution and in-
equality in the gains that diﬀerent groups receive from globalization.
As ﬁrst pointed out by Kanbur (2001), critics of globalization also tend
to focus on shorter-term impacts, while globalization’s proponents are
more concerned about the longer term. Critics of globalization also focus
on the losses experienced by subgroups of the poor, even when poverty has
declined on aggregate. Aisbett suggests a number of explanations for this
value preference, including recent evidence from behavioral experiments.
Aisbett also argues that many people believe that the current form of
globalization is based on processes that distill both political and market
power upward and away from the poor. In particular, critics of globaliza-
tion believe that corporate and commercial lobbies have disproportionate
access to the international organizations such as the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) and IMF, and that rich countries exploit their power within
these international organizations. This belief about the processes through
which globalization occurs is partly what predisposes them to interpret the
available evidence negatively.
This volume seeks to address these misunderstandings and also presents
comprehensive new evidence on the possible linkages between globaliza-
tion and poverty amelioration. Nevertheless, a number of research ques-
tions remain unanswered, as described below.
1. What is the relationship between globalization and poverty in the ag-
gregate cross-country data? Although there are many pitfalls associated
with using cross-country data sets, it would nevertheless be useful to have
more information on the association between globalization—measured
using information on barriers to trade or capital ﬂows—and measures of
poverty. Evidence to date suggests that there is generally a positive associ-
ation between openness and growth, and between growth and poverty re-
duction. We would have expected that there should consequently be a pos-
itive association between openness and poverty reduction; yet the evidence
presented in this volume is quite fragile. The question remains: is the evi-
dence fragile because the cross-country data on poverty are too poor to
yield meaningful results, or because the costs of trade reforms have fallen
disproportionately on the poor? In light of our knowledge that openness to
trade is generally associated with growth, and that sectors hit by import
competition in regions like India and Colombia have gained less from
trade reforms, the possibility exists that the gains from trade in the aggre-
24 Ann Harrisongate have not been big enough to oﬀset some of the adverse distributional
consequences for the poor.
2. Who among the poor are the winners from globalization? A number of
the case studies point to winners among the poor from globalization. These
include the poor wage earners in export-competing sectors and in sectors
or regions that are recipients of foreign direct investment. Particularly in
light of the vocal criticism leveled at globalization, these beneﬁciaries
should be identiﬁed and emphasized in any future research agenda on the
relationship between globalization and poverty. Of particular interest
would be research that could further identify the impact of foreign invest-
ment inﬂows and export growth on poverty in India and China.
3. How do we integrate the poorest of the poor into the world trading sys-
tem? The very poorest individuals are often untouched by globalization.
This is evident among the poorest Mexican corn farmers who report that
they never sell corn and among the poorest Ethiopian farmers who are net
buyers of food. Africa as a continent has seen very little foreign investment
and still exports primarily unprocessed agricultural products. More re-
search is needed on how to better integrate the really poor into the global
trading system. We need to identify the critical factors, whether these are
credit, illness, lack of infrastructure, or land.
4. Can we identify the dynamic eﬀects of industrial-country trade and aid
policies? Several issues explored in this volume include the role of indus-
trial-country policies in aﬀecting the incidence of poverty in developing
countries. Those studies suggest that, at least in the short run, OECD sub-
sidies and food aid have probably helped the poor in other countries. How-
ever, further research is needed to identify whether there are longer-term,
dynamic eﬀects. For example, even if the poor in Ethiopia are currently net
beneﬁciaries from food aid, there exists the possibility that over the long
run food aid has discouraged poor farmers from planting or investing,
transforming them from net producers into net consumers.
5. Can we better identify the complementarities between measures of glob-
alization and other policies? Many of the country studies identify the im-
portance of complementary policies in determining the beneﬁts or costs
oftrade reforms for the poor. However, much more work is needed to iden-
tify which types of policies should accompany trade reforms. There has
been little analysis to show, for example, that ﬁnancial globalization would
be beneﬁcial to developing countries if it was accompanied by ﬂexible ex-
change rate regimes or better institutions. Additional work is needed to
identify whether trade reforms introduced in conjunction with labor mar-
ket reforms are more likely to reduce poverty, and how to properly design
social safety nets to accompany trade reforms. While Mexico has been suc-
cessful in targeting some of the poorest who were hurt by reforms, these
programs are expensive, and additional research could identify whether
this approach is realistic for the very poorest countries.
Introduction 25Further research is needed to identify the source of the immobility of
labor. While Topalova and Goldberg and Pavcnik show that some of these
sources are artiﬁcial—stemming from labor market legislation that in-
hibits hiring and ﬁring—Goh and Javorcik argue that much of the immo-
bility of labor in Poland is due to societal factors that discourage workers
from relocating. Further evidence identifying the relationship between
gross labor inﬂows and outﬂows and trade reforms would be useful in this
regard.
The fact that the gains or losses from trade reforms to the poor may
hinge on the mobility (or immobility) of labor needs to be more explicitlyad-
dressed in existing models of international trade. Some models (e.g., HO)
adopt assumptions of perfect factor mobility, while others (e.g., speciﬁc-
sector) assume no factor mobility. Neither assumption is consistent with
reality. In addition, many of globalization’s critics perceive the world through
the lens of imperfect competition. Yet most trade economists assume per-
fect competition or zero excess proﬁts, which is not consistent with reality
in at least some sectors of developing economies.
9 Conclusion
Many countries have made tremendous strides in reducing not only the
percentage of the population living in poverty but also the absolute num-
ber of individuals living on less than $1 a day. During the last twenty years,
developing countries increased their trade shares and slashed their tariﬀs. If
export shares are one measure of globalization, then developing countries
are now more globalized than high-income countries. To what extent is in-
creasing globalization responsible for the fall in the incidence of poverty?
The ﬁrst theme that emerges across the chapters in this volume is that the
relationship between globalization and poverty is complex; in many cases,
the outcome depends not just on trade or ﬁnancial globalization but on the
interaction of globalization with the rest of the environment. Key comple-
mentary policies include investments in human capital and infrastructure,
as well as macroeconomic stability and policies to promote credit and tech-
nical assistance to farmers. Financial globalization is more likely to pro-
mote growth and poverty reduction if it is accompanied or preceded by
the development of good institutions and governance, as well as macro-
economic stability (including the use of ﬂexible exchange rates). The role of
complementary policies in ensuring that globalization yields beneﬁts for
the poor is emerging as a critical theme for multilateral institutions (see
World Bank, forthcoming).
One related issue is that poor workers need to be able to move out of con-
tracting sectors and into expanding ones. The country studies on India and
Colombia suggest that trade reforms have been associated with an increase
in poverty only in regions with inﬂexible labor laws. Consequently, any
26 Ann Harrisonconclusions that do not take into account the labor market institutions
that could undermine labor mobility may be misleading. More research is
needed to identify whether labor legislation protects only the rights of the
small fraction of workers who typically account for the formal sector in de-
veloping economies, or whether such legislation softens short-term adjust-
ment costs and helps the labor force share in the gains from globalization.
The role of antisweatshop activists in promoting the right to organize, im-
proving working conditions, and raising wages suggests that selective in-
terventions may be successful (see Harrison and Scorse 2004).
Second, the evidence suggests that globalization leads to clearly identiﬁ-
able winners. Across several diﬀerent continents, export expansion has been
accompanied by a reduction in poverty. The evidence also points to the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of foreign direct investment. While the macroeconomic
evidence suggests that foreign direct investment is a less volatile source
of capital than other types of inﬂows, the microeconomic evidence for In-
dia, Mexico, Poland, and Colombia indicates that higher inﬂows of foreign
investment are associated with a reduction in poverty.
Third, it is also possible to identify the losers from globalization among
the poor. Poor workers in import-competing sectors—who cannot relo-
cate, possibly due to the existence of inﬂexible labor laws—are likely to be
hurt by globalization. Financial crises also aﬀect the poor disproportion-
ately, as indicated by the cross-country evidence and the erosion of real
wages following currency crises in Indonesia and Mexico. In Mexico, some
poor and most medium-income corn farmers have been negatively aﬀected
by increasing import competition.
Fourth, simple interpretations of general equilibrium trade models such
as the HO framework are likely to be incorrect. Many economists pre-
dicted that developing countries with a comparative advantage in unskilled
labor would beneﬁt from globalization through increased demand for their
unskilled-intensive goods, which in turn would reduce inequality and
poverty. The theoretical and empirical contributions to this volume sug-
gest that this interpretation of trade theory is too simple and frequently not
consistent with reality. The cross-country studies document that global-
ization has been accompanied by increasing inequality within developing
countries. One implication is that rising inequality induced by globaliza-
tion oﬀsets some of the gains in poverty reduction achieved via trade-
induced growth.
The conclusions highlighted in these studies have several key implica-
tions for the globalization debate. First, impediments to exports from de-
veloping countries exacerbate poverty in those countries. Developing
countries need access to developed-country markets. The evidence shows
a clear link between export activity and poverty reduction in Colombia,
Mexico, India, and Poland. This research suggests that eﬀorts to disman-
tle barriers to developing-country exports through international agree-
Introduction 27ments are likely to lead to further poverty reduction. The evidence for In-
dia, Mexico, and Poland also points to a strong link between foreign in-
vestment inﬂows and poverty reduction.
Second, there are losers among the poor from trade reform. In particu-
lar, this volume identiﬁes as losers the poor in import-competing sectors
following the liberalization of trade. The heterogeneity in outcomes sug-
gests that careful targeting is necessary to help the poor who are likely to
be hurt by globalization. This includes the poor in countries hit by ﬁnan-
cial crises, as well as the smallest farmers who cannot compete with the
more eﬃcient larger farmers or with expanding import competition. Mex-
ico’s transfer programs played a major role in preventing the smallest corn
farmers from experiencing a large decline in income following reforms. In
Indonesia, subsidized food was distributed to many communities. Schol-
arships and free public schooling introduced a year after the Indonesian
crisis led to subsequent increases in school enrollments, particularly
among the poorest. Extending such subsidies to health care visits and ba-
sic drugs might have arrested the decline in the use of health care that oc-
curred after the 1997 crisis.
Finally, the evidence suggests that relying on trade or foreign investment
alone is not enough. A critical role for complementary policies is high-
lighted in the country studies on Zambia, India, Colombia, Indonesia, and
Poland. The poor need better education, access to infrastructure, access to
credit for investing in technology improvements, and the ability to relocate
out of contracting sectors into expanding ones in order to take advantage
of trade reforms. Clearly, the concerns of globalization’s critics have been
heard, but much remains to be done.
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